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We show that basic materials, financials, industrial, technologies, and telecommunication equity sectors were the 
primary exporters of volatility from the U.S. and that the magnitude of the spillover increased especially during and 
post-2008 financial crisis.  Investing in low volatility spillover countries generate high Sharpe ratios for U.S. portfolio 
managers, especially during the financial crisis.  
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I. Introduction 
An unintended consequence of capital markets connectedness is that systemic risk is 
transmitted across borders, affecting economic growth, investor confidence, and capital flows.  As 
evidenced during the 2008 financial crisis, global equity market experienced large declines,1 and 
according to Batram and Bodnar (2009), falling from an all-time high of $51 trillion in October 2007 to 
$22 trillion by the end of February 2009.  Such catastrophic declines expose the inherent vulnerabilities 
of the global equity market.  From a policymaker’s viewpoint, it is important to identify whether 
volatility is home grown (heat wave) or imported (meteor shower)2 so that appropriate policies can be 
designed and implemented to safeguard domestic capital market (see Elaysiani et. al. (2015)).  Investors 
care about the linkage because volatility spillover can increase correlation between markets and reduce 
diversification benefits. While there is evidence that markets focus more on home grown volatility than 
external volatility during a contagion (Bekaert, et.al. (2014), more work is needed at the sectoral level to 
also identify the extent of volatility transmission across borders.  Whether such transmission of 
volatility affects portfolio diversification and regulators’ attempts to defend home country from 
external volatility has critical impact on capital flows and risk management.   
 
1The major stock market indices, on average, have declined by more than 10%, while emerging stock market 
indices have fallen by close to 30%. 
2Engle et al. (1990) was first to introduce these terms to describe whether market volatility is driven by its own 
volatility or affected by volatility from a foreign market. 
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In this paper, we identify volatility spillover from major U.S. investable3 equity sectors (basic 
materials, consumer staples, financials, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, 
telecommunications, and utilities) to matched investable equity sectors in selected countries (Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Russia and the United 
Kingdom).  These U.S. equity sectors are selected on the basis of their exposure to the CBOE volatility 
index (VIX) and the foreign countries selected represent major trade and investment partners of the 
U.S.  Our analysis is consistent with the existing research (see Yang and Yahngang (2016)) on the 
cross-border volatility spillover but differing in two ways: first, we pinpoint the magnitude of the 
connectedness at the industry level, and second, we examine the extent to which portfolio managers 
can use spillover coefficients to guide international investments. 
We find evidence of spillover at the aggregate level especially during the financial crisis.  
Canada was most exposed to the U.S. while India the least exposed.  Average spillover index across 
equity sectors shows Canada was most exposed to the U.S. volatility during the full sample, while 
China was least exposed.   During the pre-financial crisis4 period (January 2, 2002 – February 14, 2007), 
Canada was most exposed while China was least exposed in all 9 equity sectors.  The same results are 
obtained for spillover during the financial crisis period (February 15, 2007 – April 30, 2009).  These 
results make sense given Canada’s proximity to the U.S. and trade between these two countries.  What 
is interesting is that China was least exposed to the U.S.-specific volatility despite an increasing level of 
trade and investment between them5.  Finally, spillover during post-financial crisis (May 1, 2009 – 
September 21, 2015) is similar.  Canada was most exposed while China was least vulnerable.   
Our analysis also highlights specific equity sectors that are vulnerable to spillover from the 
U.S.  For full sample period, basic materials and oil and gas, contributed most to volatility spillover 
from the U.S, while utilities sector contributed the least.  During the pre-financial crisis, oil and gas 
sector (utilities) was the highest (lowest) contributor to spillover.  During the financial crisis, the 
technologies sector contributed to most spillover rather than the financial sector.  The utilities sector 
 
3 Investable equity indices are typically custom tailored and are constructed taking into account several factors 
including liquidity, market capitalization, float, and trading volume.  These indices are proprietary in nature. 
4 The dating of the samples is arbitrary though it generally matches the full timeline of the crisis as reported by 
the St. Luis Fed (https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/full-timeline). 
5 We find this result very interesting and it perhaps supports our anecdotal claim that China has been able to keep 
its capital market insulated through restrictions on capital flows from to the rest of the world.  
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was the lowest contributor to spillover.  Finally, the oil and gas (utilities) was the largest (smallest) 
transmitter of volatility during the post-financial crisis period. 
These results have implications for global asset allocation decisions.  High spillover translates 
into high equity market correlation, and as a result, diversification benefits from investing in these 
countries would be lower, and subsequently, capital flow to these countries should decline.  Minimum 
variance portfolio optimizations exercise using spillover magnitude as a filter confirms that investing in 
low spillover countries can generate high Sharpe ratios for the U.S. portfolio managers. 
We make several contributions to the literature.  First, the results suggest that the use of 
broader stock indexes can offer only a limited view of the meteor shower volatility spillover for the 
countries in the sample.  Rather, a sectoral analysis can pinpoint the important conduits of volatility 
spillover.  Second, we show that the sector-to-sector magnitude of the spillover varies over time.  
Third, we also identify the countries and the equity sectors that can offer greater international 
diversification benefits to U.S. portfolio managers.   
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II reviews the relevant literature and motivates our 
hypotheses.  Section III provides empirical analysis.  The final section has the conclusions. 
II. The Volatility Transmission Mechanism 
Volatility spillover is the occurrence of shocks originating from one country affecting a 
network of countries interconnected through financial connections.  A World Bank study identifies 
several volatility transmission channels based on trade, financial, commodity, and investor confidence6.  
Trade channels include imbalances in external trade as a result of currency volatility and technological 
innovation induced productivity changes.  Financial transmission channel considers the flow of foreign 
direct investment and portfolio investment as a result of either arbitrage mechanism or international 
diversification.  Linkages among banks can magnify volatility spillover because of interconnectedness 
in risk exposure.  Remittances are also vital to the transmission of shocks from one country to another.  
Commodity channel points the effects of instability in the commodities market in light of imbalances 
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in supply and demand.  Investor sentiment has also been cited in the study as an important catalyst for 
shocks being transmitted across borders.  
Several prominent studies identify whether volatility is home grown or imported.  Engle et al. 
(1990) examine the intra-daily behavior of the Yen/Dollar exchange rate with reference to the 
hypotheses of heat wave (home grown volatility) and meteor showers (imported volatility).  The 
authors find evidence of meteor shower, as opposed to a heat wave type spillover.  Susmel and Engle 
(1994) investigate the timing of mean and volatility spillover between the New York and London 
equity markets.  Their study reports that the evidence of volatility spillover between these markets is 
minimal and the impact lasts for an hour or so.  Melvin and Melvin (2003) examine volatility spillover 
of Mark/Dollar and Yen/Dollar exchange rates across global markets.  In particular, they find 
statistically significant effects of both own-region and inter-regional spillover.  They also suggest that 
heat waves are more important than meteor showers.  Clemens et al. (2015) use high-frequency (10-
minute) futures data on the dollar index, Treasury bond, and S&P500 equity index during 2003-2013 
and find that meteor shower and heat wave effects are equally significant.   
Empirical evidence of a ‘leadership role’ of the U.S. towards the global financial markets, 
especially in times of stress, is well-documented in previous research.  For example, see Elyasiani et al. 
(2015), Hamao et al. (1990), and Theodossiou and Lee (1993).  Elyasiani et al. (2015) examine the return 
and volatility interdependence among the U.S., the UK, the EU and Japanese banks and insurers 
spanning the period 2003 to 2009.  The study reports strong return and volatility transmission within 
and across banking and insurance sectors.  The relationship exhibited a strengthened contagion 
spillover during the crisis period of 2007 to 2009, with the U.S. financial institutions as information 
providers in global markets.  Kanas (1998) investigates the return volatility spillover across three major 
European markets, namely, London, Frankfurt and Paris, for the period from January 1984 to 
December 1993.  The study reports bi-directional spillover between London and Paris and Frankfurt 
and Paris, with unidirectional spillover from London to Frankfurt.  The study finds that the magnitude 
and intensity of spillover increased during the post-crash period.   
Golosnoy et al. (2012) examined volatility spillover using the intra-daily data of the Dow Jones 
and DAX.  They find evidence of significant short-term volatility spillover within both markets (heat-
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wave effect), as well as across the two markets (meteor shower effect).  Their study also discovers that 
the spillover effects between the U.S. and the German stock markets are of significantly longer 
duration and increased after the subprime crisis, which indicates substantial contagion effects.  Beale 
(2005) investigates the contagion and volatility spillover from the U.S. markets to 13 European equity 
markets using weekly data over the period January 1980 to August 2001.  The study finds that spillover 
intensities increased most in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.  Beale 
contends that increased trade integration, equity market development, and low inflation have 
contributed to the increase in the European Union stock spillover intensity.   
Beirne et al. (2008) explore the issue of volatility spillover and contagion from mature to 41 
emerging stock markets.  Their study suggests that spillover from established markets influences the 
conditional variance of return in many local and emerging markets.  Furthermore, the spillover 
parameter changes during turbulent periods in developed countries. Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) 
examine both total and directional volatility spillover across U.S. stock, bond, foreign exchange and 
commodity markets using daily data and a framework of generalized vector autoregressive model 
spanning the period January 1999 to January 2010.  The study finds evidence of very limited spillover 
prior to the global financial crisis period of 2007.  However, volatility spillover intensified from the 
stock market to other market after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
More recent studies examine industry level spillover around the 2008 financial crisis.  Kouki et 
al. (2011) consider key industry sectors such as banking, financial services, industrial, real estate and oil, 
of selected developed and emerging markets over the period January 2002 to October 2009.  They find 
that both shocks and the volatility of the U.S. banking sector are transmitted to developed and 
emerging markets, which confirms the hypothesis that the U.S. plays a dominant role in the diffusion 
of information.  Barunik et al. (2016) investigate asymmetries in volatility spillovers using data of 21 
most liquid U.S. stocks from seven sectors (financials, information technology, energy, consumer 
discretionary, consumer staples, telecommunication services and health care) spanning the period 
August 2004 to December 2011.  The study finds evidence of asymmetric connectedness of stocks at 
the sectoral level with the spillover of bad and good volatility are transmitted at varying magnitudes 
across sectors over time.  The study also reports that intra-market spillover increased substantially 
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during the global financial crisis (GFC).  The sector-level heterogeneity in the transmission mechanism 
of volatility spillovers was attributed to the activity of informed traders (which reduces volatility) and 
uninformed traders (which increases volatility). 
Studies by Barunik, et al. (2016) and Baur (2012) suggest that stock market spillover studies 
based broader stock indexes cannot show how much risk was transmitted by the sectoral components 
of the index.  This is a major shortcoming because an identification of the equity sectors vulnerable to 
domestic or foreign equity sectors is critical for designing policies to safeguard capital markets.  
Furthermore, the degree to which a capital market is exposed to foreign shocks can also be used as a 
screening device for constructing internationally diversified portfolios.  For example, investing in low 
volatility spillover countries and industries could allow U.S. portfolio managers to hedge U.S.-specific 
systemic risk.  Surprisingly, this line of research where the magnitude of meteor shower is used as a 
screening device to guide portfolio diversification is missing. 
III. Empirical Model 
We use daily data for the period January 2, 2002 to September 21, 2015.  The sample is split 
into four separate regimes to examine the dynamic nature of spillover: Full Sample (January 2, 2002 – 
September 21, 2015), Pre-Financial Crisis (January 2, 2002 – February 14, 2007), Financial Crisis 
(February 15, 2007 – April 30, 2009), and Post-financial Crisis (May 1, 2009 – September 21, 2015).  
Data on equity sectoral investable equity indices are collected from Datastream7.  Log returns are based 
on end-of-day closing prices.  To avoid nonsynchronous trading and time zone differences, European 
and North American financial data are matched on a daily basis.  Asian market data were lagged one 
day to account for the fact that U.S. still remains as the leading source of all market volatility. 
As noted earlier, our choice of equity sectors and countries is based on several factors.  First, 
we select the VIX8 index as a measure of uncertainty in the broad U.S. equity market.  On the basis of 
negative correlation between VIX and the U.S. equity returns, we selected the following 10 U.S. 
investable equity sectors: the aggregate stock market index (MSCI Investable Index), basic materials, 
consumer staples, financials, health care, industrials, oil and gas, technology, telecommunications, and 
 
7The sample period is based upon data availability.  We thank ThomsonReuters for the data. 
8VIX is based on out-of-the money front and second month expiration call and put options on S&P500. It has 
also been referred to as the 'fear index'.   
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utilities).  These equity sectors are then matched with their corresponding investable sectoral indices in 
13 trading partners of the US: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Spain, Russia and the United Kingdom.  As reported by the U.S. Treasury, at the end of 2013, the U.S. 
equity portfolio managers held $5.7 trillion in foreign stocks out of $6.47 trillion investments in foreign 
securities (Table 1).  The United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Korea, Australia, Brazil, 
and China are among the leading countries receiving the bulk of equity investments from the United 
States.  In addition, Russia9 and India were added on the basis of recent data on foreign direct 
investment10.  Table 2 reports the market value of the U.S. holdings of foreign stocks.  We selected all 
equity sectors listed in the table, with the exception of few sectors where the composition of a 
particular U.S. sectoral equity index did not exactly match the foreign index.   
We conducted several preliminary diagnostic tests (results not reported to save space) on 
equity returns.  First, KPSS and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests detected the presence of 
unit root (non-stationarity) in the raw data in the levels. Next, in majority of the cases, the returns are 
negatively skewed, suggesting that the equity markets experienced a large decline during the full sample 
period.  The Bera-Jarque indicated departure from normality.  The Lagrange Multiplier test (R^2 test) 
detected autocorrelation in the squared residuals.   
As discussed earlier, the U.S. equity sectors are selected on the basis of their correlation with 
VIX, which would confirm that the volatility in these equity sectors convey information on the 
aggregate market uncertainty.  In Table 3 (Panel A), correlation coefficients between returns on U.S. 
aggregate and sectoral equity indices and the VIX are reported.  The returns on the VIX and the 
aggregate equity index (the U.S. MSCI Investible Index) are negatively correlated, supporting the view 
that the VIX is a conveyor of uncertainty in the U.S. market.  Panel A, Table 3 also shows that during 
the financial crisis, correlation fell to -.76 and post-financial crisis correlation drops to -.80, suggesting 
uncertainty in the equity market is associated with larger decline in returns.   
The U.S. sectoral equity returns are also negatively correlated with VIX returns.  For the full 
sample period, the lowest negative correlation (-.71) is observed for the industrial sector returns while 
 
9Direct investment position of the United States in Russia from 2000 to 2014 (in billion U.S. dollars, on a 
historical-cost basis). http://www.statista.com/statistics/188637/united-states-direct-investments-in-russia-since-
2000/ (accessed March 4, 2016). 
10India West, Thursday, March 3, 2016. 
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the highest is observed for telecommunication and utilities sectors.  During the crisis period, consumer 
staples, industrials, and technology sectors experienced higher negative correlation with VIX returns.  
Post-financial crisis correlations show an increase in negative correlation between returns on industrial 
sectors and the VIX.  Overall, these sectors are reasonable conveyors of uncertainty in the U.S. market. 
Panel B, Table 3 shows that the aggregate equity market returns from the selected countries in 
the sample are negatively correlated with the VIX returns11.  The smallest correlation is observed for 
India while the largest negative correlation is observed for Canada.  For sectoral equity indices, the 
results are similar.  All correlation coefficients are found to be negative with the largest negative value 
observed for the industrial sector for Germany, while the telecommunication sector returns in China 
have the lowest correlation.  Overall, the sample correlation coefficients indicate that the VIX and the 
U.S. sectoral indices have information content about uncertainty in the equity market. 
Volatility Spillover Index Model 
The study employs the generalized spillover index to identify the inter-linkages between the 
variables using a framework proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009, 2012).  The method optimally 
synthesize the notions of volatility spillover coined by Engle et al. (1990), variance decompositions 
(VDCs) proposed by Sims (1980a, 1980b) and a framework of generalized impulse response functions 
(IRFs) suggested by Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996), and Pesaran and Shin (1998), and termed 
hereafter KPPS.  The impacts of cross country inter-sector spillover are examined by evaluating 
generalized VDCs and VDCs are invariant to the ordering of variables.  The VDCs, in percentage 
terms, decompose the forecast error variance of a dependent variable into components attributable to 
own innovations and innovations of other explanatory variables.  We estimate a p-th order, N-variable 








     (1) 
Where )...,,( ,21 Ntttt ZZZZ =  is a vector of N endogenous variables, Bi are i = 1,…, p are NXN 
autoregressive coefficients matrices and εt is vector of error term that are serially uncorrelated; t = 1, …, 
 
11To conserve space, we only report the correlation coefficients for the full sample. 
12 For expository convenience, this section is heavily drawn from Diebold and Yilmaz (2012).   
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T.  The VAR model contains fourteen variables (N = 14).  The ε ̴(0,∑) is a vector of independently and 






itit AZ          (2) 
where the NXN coefficients matrices Ai obey the recursion 
pjpiii ABABABA −−− +++= ...2211  
with 0A  being an NXN identity matrix and 0=iA  for i < 0.
13  The total and directional spillovers are 
produced by the generalized forecast-error variance decompositions of the moving average 
representation of system (1).  The VDCs define the ‘own variance shares’ as a fraction of H-step-ahead 
variance in forecasting iZ , for i = 1, 2, …N and ‘cross variance share or spillover’, as the fraction of H-
step-ahead error variances in forecasting 
jZ , for i, j =1, 2,…N, such that ji  .  Using the notion of 
































        (3) 
where ∑ is variance matrix for the error ε, 
jj signifies the standard deviation of the error term for the 
j-th equation, and ie  is the selection vector with one as the i-th element and zeros elsewhere.  The own 
variance and cross variance shares are contained in the main diagonal and off-diagonal elements of 
)(H matrix, respectively.  Each entry of the VDC matrix is normalized by its row sum as the own 
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13 Interested readers are referred to Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl and Lee (1988), and Sims (1980b) for 
detailed derivation of the moving average representation and the calculation of VDCs, and for a discussion of 
generalized impulse response functions, to Koop et al. (1996). 
 

















  by construction (see Diebold and Yilmaz 2012, p. 58).  Using (3) 
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The total spillover index (TS) measures the average contribution of spillovers from shocks to all system 
variables/sectors to the total forecast error variance.14 
Table 4 reports aggregate and sector volatility spillover to the foreign equity sectors during the 
4 distinct regimes.  The foreign countries are arranged in an alphabetical order.  In Panel A, 13% 
(highest spillover) of the aggregate market volatility of Canada during the sample period was 
contributed by the U.S.  In contrast, 3.6% (lowest spillover) of the Indian equity market volatility was 
contributed by the U.S.   There is also evidence that the U.S. market volatility during the period has 
affected the remaining countries in the sample.  These are (in order of low to high spillover) Russia, 
Korea, China, Italy, Spain, Japan, France, Germany, the UK, Australia, and Brazil. 
Unfortunately, these results do not address the reasons for this volatility spillover.  We believe 
investor sentiment and portfolio diversification are critical elements of this spillover.  As reported 
earlier (Table 1), the U.S. portfolio managers held over $5.7 trillion worth of foreign equities from 
these high spillover countries.  Such cross-border holdings of foreign equities can provide the 
transmission mechanism of connectedness between capital markets.  Second, the aggregate volatility 
spillover analysis is flawed because it assumes that all constituent sectors of the index would be equally 
affecting their counterparts in foreign countries.  In the next section, we explore volatility spillover at 
the sectoral level to provide more insights into the degree of connectedness among the equity sectors. 
Volatility Spillover: Sectoral Evidence 
 
14We ignore returns spillover because our focus is on the transmission of risk.  Returns spillover may have 
broader implications for market efficiency which is not addressed in this paper.  We ignore reverse volatility 
spillover from these selected countries to the U.S. 
 
12 | P a g e  
 
Sectoral spillover (Panel A, Table 4) shows that the U.S basic metals industry contributed to 
15.1% of the volatility in Canada, while China was least affected (1.9%) among the countries in the 
sample.  For consumer staples industry, Canada was most exposed (15.3%) while China was least 
sensitive (.9%) to the U.S. volatility.  The U.S. financial sector was responsible for 16% volatility in the 
Canadian financial sector, the largest spillover among the countries in the sample.  Again, China was 
least sensitive.  Exposure for the remaining countries to the U.S. financial sector are (from low to high 
spillover): India, Russia, Italy, Korea, Spain, France, Japan, Germany, the UK, Brazil, and Australia.  
The average magnitude of spillover in these countries was 6.9%.  This is hardly surprising given that 
the U.S. portfolio managers held almost $6 trillion of equities from these countries (Table 1).   
For the health care sector, Germany, Canada, the UK, France, Japan, Australia, Italy, Spain, 
India, China, Korea, Canada, and Italy were most affected by volatility in the U.S. health care 
industry15.  In contrast, Korea, China, and India were least exposed.  For the industrial sector, the order 
of spillover (from low to high) is as follows: China, India, Korea, Italy, Spain, Brazil, France, the UK, 
Japan, Australia, Germany, and Canada.  In the oil and gas sector, 19.1% of the volatility in Canada was 
contributed by the U.S., which is consistent with the fact that Canada is the major provider of energy 
to the U.S.  India, China, and Korea were the only countries least affected by the U.S. spillover.  In the 
technologies sector, China, India, Italy, Australia, Korea, and Spain were the least affected countries.  
In contrast, 14.7% volatility of the Canadian technologies sector returns can be explained by the U.S.  
For the telecommunication sector, Brazil was most affected while China was least exposed.  Finally, 
Canada was most affected (11.1%) in the utilities sector while China again was least affected. 
Overall, spillover during the full sample period suggests that China experienced the least 
volatility spillover from the U.S. in 7 out of 9 equity sectors while Canada was the highest recipient of 
volatility spillover in 7 out of 9 equity sectors.  Brazil experienced the second highest level of spillover 
during the same period, which is surprising given that the 2013 U.S. holdings of Brazilian equities was 
valued at less than $130 billion.  A fundamental assumption in our paper is that high volatility spillover 
indicates connectedness of the markets through international diversification of U.S. equity portfolios.  
It could also reflect the flow of information across international borders.  We believe that volatility 
 
15Health care equity index data were not available for Russia and Brazil. 
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spillover and asset allocation decisions are correlated, i.e., low volatility index countries included in a 
portfolio should offer superior risk reduction compared to alternative investment strategies.  We 
examine this issue in a later section.  
Sectoral Volatility Spillover: Pre-Financial Crisis 
Pre-financial crisis spillover is presented in Panel B.  At the aggregate level, Canada was 
affected most by the U.S. aggregate volatility to the tune of 13.6%, while India was affected the least 
(2.6%).  In essence, most developed countries were exposed to the U.S., leaving the developing 
countries least exposed.  With regard to sectoral spillover, Canada was most affected by the U.S. basic 
materials sector (17.2%) and China was least affected (.7%).  For the consumer staples industry, 
Canada was most exposed (18%) while China was least sensitive (.1%).  The U.S. financial sector was 
responsible for 16.1% volatility in the Canadian financial sector.  Again, China was least sensitive.  The 
remaining vulnerable countries are Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Spain and Australia.  In contrast, 
China, India and Russia were least sensitive to the U.S.  Surprisingly, Japan had low spillover despite 
the fact that during 2013, the U.S. portfolio managers held over $600 billion of Japanese equity. 
For the health care sector, Canada, the UK, Germany, and France were most affected by the 
U.S.  In contrast, China, Korea, India, Spain, Australia, Japan, and Italy were least exposed to the US.  
For the industrial sector, the U.S. affected volatility in mostly the developed countries, while the 
spillover in China, India, Brazil, and Spain were less than 5% on average.  In the oil and gas sector, 
21.2% of the volatility in Canada was contributed by the US.  India, China, Korea, Russia, for example, 
were among the countries least affected.  In the technologies sector, China, Australia, Korea, and India 
were the least affected countries in the sample.  In contrast, 15.6% volatility of the Canadian 
technologies sector can be explained by the U.S. market volatility.  For the telecommunication sector, 
Canada was most affected while China was least vulnerable to the volatility spillover from the US.  
Finally, Brazil was most affected in the utilities sector while China again was least affected. 
Sectoral Volatility Spillover: Financial Crisis 
Volatility spillover from the U.S. during the financial crisis is reported in Panel C.  At the 
aggregate level, India was least exposed while Canada was the largest recipient of volatility spillover 
from the U.S.  The level of spillover is slightly higher than the pre-crisis level.  The median level of 
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volatility spillover is 6.9% and Japan, France, the UK, Australia, Brazil and Canada have higher than 
the median volatility spillover.  Among the lowest spillover countries are India, Russia, Korea, and 
China.  With the exception of Brazil, all countries in the high volatility category are developed 
countries with mature capital markets free of investment restrictions.   
Sectoral volatility spillover shows the level of U.S.-specific exposure of these countries.  
Canada was most affected by the U.S. basic materials sector volatility (14.6%) and China was least 
affected (1.8%).  For consumer staples industry, Canada was most exposed (13.4%) while China was 
least sensitive (2.2%).  The U.S. financial sector volatility was responsible for 14.8% volatility in 
Canada.  Again, China was least sensitive.  Among the remaining countries exposed to the U.S. are 
Australia, Brazil, the UK, Germany, Japan, Spain, France, Italy, Korea, India, and Russia (from high to 
low spillover).  In contrast, China, India and Russia were least sensitive to the U.S.-specific volatility. 
For the health care sector, China, Korea, and India were least exposed to the U.S.  For the 
industrial sector, the U.S. affected volatility in mostly the developed countries, while the spillover in 
China, India, and Korea was less than 5%, on average.  Canada was ranked as the country receiving the 
most spillover from the U.S.  In the oil and gas sector, 17.4% of the volatility in Canada was 
contributed by the U.S.  India, China, and Korea, for example, were among the countries least affected 
by the U.S. spillover.  In the technologies sector, China registered volatility spillover at less than 5% 
(1.5%).  In contrast, 15.2% volatility in Canada can be explained by the U.S. market volatility.  For the 
telecommunication sector, Brazil was most affected while China was least vulnerable to the U.S.  
Finally, Canada was most affected in the utilities sector while China again was least affected. 
Sectoral Volatility Spillover: Post-Financial Crisis 
We expected a lower level of spillover post-financial crisis for the countries that were most 
exposed during the financial crisis.  The rationale is that these countries would implement appropriate 
policies to reduce their U.S.-specific exposure.  However, the results do not support this conjecture.  
At the aggregate level, India was the lowest recipient while Canada was the largest recipient of volatility 
spillover from the U.S. The level of spillover is slightly higher than the crisis level.  All countries, with 
the exception of India, remained significantly exposed to the U.S. volatility.   
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Regarding sectoral volatility spillover, Canada was most affected by the U.S. basic materials 
sector (14%) and China was least affected (2.5%).  For the consumer staples industry, Canada was 
most exposed (12.6%) while China was least sensitive (1%) to the U.S. consumer staples industry 
volatility spillover.  The U.S. financial sector contributed to 13.9% volatility in the Canadian financial 
sector.  Again, China was least sensitive.  Among the remaining countries that were also affected by 
spillover in the financial sector are Brazil, Germany, Australia, UK, Japan, Korea, France, Italy, Spain, 
Russia, and India (in order of high to low spillover).  The magnitude of the U.S. contribution in these 
countries except India and Russia was more than 4% on average. In the oil and gas sector, 18% of the 
volatility in Canada was contributed by the U.S.  China, India, and Korea, for example, were among the 
countries least affected by the U.S. spillover.  In the technologies sector, China, Italy, India, and 
Australia were the least affected countries in the sample.  In contrast, 11.6% volatility of the German 
technologies sector returns can be explained by the U.S. market volatility.  For the telecommunication 
sector, Canada was most affected while China and Italy were the lowest receiver of spillover.  Finally, 
Canada was most affected in the utilities sector while China again was least affected.   
In summary, these results show the transmission of volatility by country and by sector over 
time, a unique perspective that has been long overdue.  Our analysis identifies the countries and the 
industrial sectors that were most and least exposed during several periods, including the financial crisis.  
These results may have policy implications.  From a regulatory standpoint, countries on the receiving 
end can design appropriate policies to curb the extent of meteor shower effects.  This can promote a 
sense of stability and resilience of their markets to attract foreign investors. 
Vulnerability to the U.S. originated volatility spillover 
Table 5 summarizes the spillover results by ranking these countries in order of high to low 
vulnerability to the U.S. based on their spillover index.  The country with the highest spillover index is 
noted as ‘Most Exposed’ and the country with the lowest vulnerability is identified as ‘Least Exposed’.  
For the full sample period, at the aggregate level, Canada remains as most vulnerable to the U.S.  As 
we have noted earlier, this is consistent given the geographical proximity and international trade flows 
between the countries.  In comparison, India was least exposed to the U.S. equity market.  While India 
remains as an important trade partner to the U.S., capital market restrictions that still exist in India for 
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two-way investment flows may be responsible for the low exposure of India to meteor shower from 
the U.S. 
Table 5 also presents the most exposed and least exposed for all 4 samples at the sectoral  
level.  During the full sample, out of 9 equity sectors, Canada received the highest spillover in 7 sectors 
while China scored the lowest rank in 7 sectors.  During the pre-financial crisis period, Canada scored 
the highest spillover in 8 while China was ranked as the country with the lowest spillover in 8 sectors.  
During the financial crisis period, Canada was ranked again as the most exposed country in terms of 
spillover in 7 out of 9 equity sectors.  During the same period, China was least exposed in 7 out of 9 
equity sectors.  Finally, during the post-financial crisis period, Canada was most exposed in 8 out of 9 
sectors.  During the same period, China received the lowest spillover in 6 out of 9 equity sectors.  
These results may have policy implications.  From a regulatory standpoint, countries on the 
receiving end can design policies to curb the extent of meteor shower effects and insulate their equity 
sectors.  As markets become less subject to external volatility, it promotes a sense of stability and 
resilience which may be attractive to global investors.   
Portfolio Asset Allocation using Spillover Index as a Criterion 
In this section, we conduct minimum variance optimization16 to build globally diversified 
portfolios by allowing a portfolio manager to use the spillover index as a screening tool.  We assume 
that portfolio managers would prefer to invest in low spillover countries for good diversification 
benefits.  Table 6 reports the Sharpe ratio for several portfolios.  The benchmark return is assumed to 
be the U.S. equity return (S&P500).  The risk-free rate is based on the 10-yr U.S. Treasury bond.  
We adopt 3 different allocation strategies based on the spillover index: Strategy 1: invest 
without screening, Strategy 2:  invest in low spillover (defined as spillover less than the median 
spillover) countries, and Strategy 3:  invest in high spillover countries.  At the aggregate level (Panel 
A), the Sharpe ratios from strategy 1 are: .08 (full sample), .59 (pre-financial crisis), -1.72 (financial 
crisis), and .22 (post-financial crisis).  For strategy 2, the Sharpe ratios are: .17 (full sample), .59 (pre-
financial crisis), -1.02 (financial crisis), and .58 (post-financial crisis).  Finally, for strategy 3, the Sharpe 
 
16We do not allow short sell and maximum weight on a single country or sector is capped at 25%. 
 
17 | P a g e  
 
ratios are: -.04 (full sample), .37 (pre-financial crisis), -1.01 (financial crisis), .25 (post-financial crisis).  
At the aggregate, strategy 2 has the best Sharpe ratios, even during the financial crisis.   
At the sectoral level (Panel B), similar investment strategies were applied to all sectors.  With 
strategy 1, the Sharpe ratio was .33, which was higher than the Sharpe ratio from an aggregate index-
based investment strategy (Panel A).  During the pre-financial crisis, the strategy has a Sharpe ratio 
of .88.  During the financial crisis, the performance of this strategy (-1.89) was worse than the strategy 
1 applied to the aggregate indices (-1.72).  The post-financial crisis performance of the strategy is better 
than the results based on aggregate stock indices.  The Sharpe ratio was .68, which shows a 209% 
improvement over the results based on aggregate stock indices. 
When the universe included only low spillover sectors (sectors with less than the median level 
of spillover), the Sharpe ratios are as follows: .38 (full sample), .98 (pre-financial crisis), -.88 (financial 
crisis), and .93 (post-financial crisis).  Finally, when the universe included sectors scoring higher than 
the median spillover (strategy 3), the Sharpe ratios are as follows: .18 (full sample), .53 (pre-financial 
crisis), -1.57 (financial crisis), and .54 (post-financial crisis). 
Sector Diversification 
We also experimented with single sector (Panels C-K) diversification strategies.  For basic 
materials sector, strategy 2 generated the highest Sharpe ratio of 1.32 during the pre-financial crisis 
period.  Strategy 1 would have produced a Sharpe ratio of -1.27 during the financial crisis.  In the 
consumer staples sector, strategy 3 produced the highest Sharpe ratio of 1.11 during the post-financial 
crisis period, which is surprising.  We believe that taking an aggressive investment strategy on a bull 
market (recovery period) produces this result.  Strategy 1 produced a Sharpe ratio of -1.91 during the 
financial crisis period.  For the financial sector, strategy 2 would have produced a Sharpe ratio of 1.03 
during the pre-financial crisis period.  The same strategy would have been the ideal choice during the 
financial crisis as the portfolio would have lost the least.  The healthcare industry offers the best Sharpe 
ratio during the post-financial crisis.  The Sharpe ratio was 1.66 for strategy 2.  The lowest Sharpe ratio 
for this sector was for strategy 1 during the financial crisis.  For the remaining sectors, the highest 
Sharpe ratios for the sample periods are as follows: 1.0 (industrial; pre-financial crisis; low spillover 
strategy), .94 (oil and gas; pre-financial crisis; low spillover strategy), .84 (technology; post-financial 
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crisis; low spillover strategy), .33 (telecommunications; post-financial crisis; low spillover strategy), 
and .82 (utilities; pre-financial crisis; no screening).   
IV. Conclusions 
The extant literature suggests that volatility is both home grown (heat wave) and imported 
(meteor shower), making policy decisions even more complicated.  Previous attempts to capture the 
extent of global connectedness have relied on aggregate stock indexes.  Unfortunately, one of the 
shortcomings of these attempts is that one cannot identify the principal investable equity sectors that 
are most susceptible to meteor showers from the U.S.  Additionally, there has not been any attempt to 
use the magnitude of meteor shower as a screening device to guide international investment from the 
U.S.  Our paper addresses these two shortcomings.  We identify the extent of volatility spillover from 
the major U.S. equity sectors (basic materials, consumer staples, financials, health care, industrials, oil 
and gas, technology, telecommunications, and utilities) to their corresponding equity sectors in 13 
trading and investment partners of the U.S. (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Spain, Russia and the United Kingdom).  Subsequently, we use spillover 
coefficients at the industry level to guide international investments. 
During the full sample period (January 2, 2002 – September 21, 2015), two industries, basic 
materials and oil and gas, contributed most to volatility spillover from the U.S.  During the same 
period, utilities sector was the least contributor to the spillover.  During the pre-financial crisis (January 
2, 2002 – February 14, 2007), oil and gas sector (utilities) was the highest (lowest) contributor to 
spillover.  During the financial crisis (February 15, 2007 – April 30, 2009), we find that the financial 
sector was not the largest contributor to spillover.  Rather, the technologies sector contributed to most 
spillover.  The utilities sector was the lowest contributor to spillover.  Finally, during the post-financial 
crisis period (May 1, 2009 – September 21, 2015), oil and gas (utilities) was the largest (smallest) 
contributor to spillover.    
As expected, high spillover leads to high equity market correlation and as a result, lower 
diversification benefits from investing in these countries. Our minimum variance portfolio 
optimizations using spillover coefficients as a filter confirms this hypothesis.  The U.S. portfolio 
managers can earn high Sharpe ratios by investing in low spillover countries.   
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As the extent of global connectedness rises, there is urgency among policymakers to correctly 
identify the principal sources of volatility in the domestic capital market.  The fact that domestic capital 
markets respond to internal and external systematic risk suggests the need for appropriate policy 
responses to deal with disparate sources of shocks, without disrupting the free flow of capital.  
Investors also worry that increased uncertainty from volatility spillover can affect their international 
asset allocation decisions.  There have been several policy recommendations to deal with volatility 
spillover.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2012) recommend the IMF and other institutions to play a greater role 
with early warning and implementation of market discipline.  To limit the financial vulnerabilities 
associated with the sectoral spillovers, some form of capital control may be prudent.  Ostry et al (2012) 
constructed foreign-currency (FX)-related prudential measures and financial-sector specific controls 
for emerging markets economies over the period 1995-2008.  The study found both capital controls 
and FX-related prudential measures lead to a lower proportion of FX lending in domestic bank credit 
and a lower proportion of portfolio debt in total external liabilities.  These prudential measures reduce 
the intensity of aggregate credit booms and enhance economic resilience of financial system during 
stressed financial markets.  There is evidence that higher regulatory quality and higher credit-to-deposit 
ratio increases the effectiveness of prudential measures in managing cross-border bank flows and in 
mitigating systemic risks for 66 advanced and emerging market economies spanning the period 1999-
2012 (Beirne  and Friedrich (2017)).  In short, prudential measures may restrict access to capital 
markets by restricting capital flows across borders, regulatory agencies must not limit the maturity of 
emerging capital markets.  To this extent, the results in this paper offer a framework for identifying the 
sectoral sources of volatility propagation and the need to adopt sound regulatory policies that promote 





Table 1: Market value of U.S. holdings of foreign equity, by country, and type of equity, for the countries attracting the most U.S. investment 
(as of December 31, 2013) 
Billions of dollars 
 
Country or region Total Common stock Fund shares Others* 
United Kingdom 978 898 27 54 
Cayman Islands 677 277 277 124 
Japan 604 597 6 0 
Switzerland 430 427 1 1 
Canada 405 387 12 6 
France 343 335 5 4 
Germany 302 279 1 22 
Netherlands 230 216 7 7 
Ireland 228 209 12 7 
Bermuda 179 160 10 9 
Korea, South 147 141 0 6 
Australia 144 131 12 2 
Hong Kong 135 129 5 1 
Brazil 129 98 1 30 
China, mainland 101 98 3 0 
Taiwan 98 98 0 0 
Rest of world 1343 1238 50 56 
Total 6473 5715 429 329 
*Source: U.S. Treasury.  Includes preferred stock, interests in limited partnerships and other types of equity.  Excludes Hong Kong and Macau, which are reported separately. 
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Table 2: Market value of U.S. holdings of foreign securities, by industry, as of December 31, 2013 
Billions of dollars 
GICS Code* Industry Total Equity 
Debt 
Long-Term Short-term 
1010 Total Energy 789 614 174 1 
1510 Total Materials 596 456 138 2 
2000 Total Industrial 741 658 82 1 
2500 Total Consumer Discretionary 789 739 49 1 
3000 Total Consumer Staples 586 530 53 3 
3500 Total Health Care 582 548 32 2 
4000 Total Financial 2977 1853 851 272 
4500 Total Informational Technology 653 621 32 0 
5010 Total Telecommunications Services 363 283 79 1 
5510 Total Utilities 192 127 63 2 
 Government** 759 1 695 63 
 Industry Classification Unknown 103 41 57 5 
 Total all industries 9130 6473 2305 353 
 
 
Source: U.S. Treasury.   
*Stands for Global Classification Industry Standard Code. 
**Government includes central, local, and provincial governments, and government-sponsored or guaranteed corporations. Debt issued by international and regional organizations 






Table 3: Panel A: Correlation between U.S. aggregate and sectoral stock returns with VIX returns 
  Aggregate Basic Materials Consumer Staples Financials Health Care Industrials Oil and Gas Technology Telecommunication Utilities 
Full Sample -0.75 -0.66 -0.68 -0.63 -0.68 -0.71 -0.61 -0.65 -0.55 -0.55 
Pre-financial Crisis -0.73 -0.66 -0.62 -0.66 -0.61 -0.66 -0.52 -0.59 -0.49 -0.46 
Financial Crisis -0.76 -0.67 -0.73 -0.66 -0.69 -0.73 -0.65 -0.72 -0.67 -0.67 
Post-financial crisis -0.80 -0.71 -0.77 -0.71 -0.74 -0.76 -0.69 -0.74 -0.60 -0.57 




Table 3: Panel B: Correlation between foreign aggregate and sectoral stock returns with VIX returns 







Financials Health Care Industrials Oil and Gas Technology Telecommunication Utilities 
Australia -0.43 -0.39 -0.22 -0.36 -0.27 -0.39 -0.37 -0.24 -0.16 -0.26 
Brazil -0.5 -0.45 -0.28 -0.44 - -0.37 -0.38 - -0.38 -0.36 
Canada -0.56 -0.39 -0.45 -0.48 -0.32 -0.49 -0.44 -0.35 -0.29 -0.38 
China -0.32 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.1 -0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.09 
France -0.48 -0.41 -0.43 -0.44 -0.36 -0.44 -0.4 -0.38 -0.32 -0.31 
Germany -0.47 -0.48 -0.35 -0.49 -0.37 -0.49 - -0.4 -0.36 -0.37 
India -0.21 -0.18 -0.14 -0.18 -0.14 -0.19 -0.13 -0.18 -0.11 -0.11 
Italy -0.46 -0.32 -0.4 -0.43 -0.29 -0.44 -0.37 -0.21 -0.31 -0.38 
Japan -0.39 -0.36 -0.38 -0.34 -0.32 -0.38 -0.32 -0.37 -0.27 -0.16 
Korea -0.29 -0.26 -0.19 -0.26 -0.08 -0.25 -0.21 -0.2 -0.14 -0.15 
Russia -0.28 -0.17 - -0.22 - - -0.22 - -0.2 -0.17 
Spain -0.45 -0.4 -0.28 -0.42 -0.31 -0.41 -0.38 -0.31 -0.38 -0.39 
The UK -0.46 -0.38 -0.36 -0.41 -0.3 -0.42 -0.35 -0.35 -0.32 -0.3 
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Table 4: Volatility Spillover Index – Percentage of foreign country’s equity market volatility contributed by the U.S. equity market volatility 
Panel A: Full Sample 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Aggregate 8.9% 10.0% 13.0% 5.8% 7.3% 7.7% 3.6% 6.3% 7.2% 5.3% 4.9% 6.4% 7.7% 
Basic Materials 10.3% 11.9% 15.1% 1.9% 8.2% 9.1% 2.8% 8.0% 7.7% 6.6% 5.5% 7.0% 9.6% 
Consumer Staples 5.6% 5.9% 15.3% 0.9% 10.3% 8.4% 2.2% 7.7% 8.7% 3.8% -- 5.0% 9.5% 
Financials 9.9% 8.2% 16.0% 1.5% 6.9% 7.8% 3.5% 5.5% 7.0% 5.6% 3.6% 5.7% 8.0% 
Health Care 6.9% -- 10.3% 0.7% 9.8% 10.3% 2.0% 6.7% 9.4% 0.5% -- 6.5% 9.9% 
Industrials 9.3% 8.1% 14.4% 1.2% 8.3% 9.6% 2.7% 7.1% 8.4% 5.1% -- 7.1% 8.3% 
Oil and Gas 10.8% 11.6% 19.1% 1.4% 8.9% -- 0.7% 8.1% 9.0% 4.0% 5.8% 6.6% 10.0% 
Technologies 5.1% -- 14.7% 0.8% 11.0% 11.5% 4.3% 4.9% 10.5% 5.1% -- 6.8% 9.6% 
Telecommunication 2.2% 8.9% 8.0% 0.3% 4.5% 5.9% 0.7% 4.9% 5.9% 2.4% 2.2% 5.8% 6.9% 
Utilities 3.8% 8.5% 11.1% 0.3% 5.1% 5.6% 0.6% 4.4% 1.9% 2.2% 2.0% 5.1% 5.6% 
 
Panel B: Pre-financial Crisis 
 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Aggregate 9.5% 8.5% 13.6% 5.3% 7.7% 8.6% 2.6% 6.4% 5.5% 5.3% 3.8% 6.6% 7.3% 
Basic Materials 8.3% 8.3% 17.2% 0.7% 8.2% 9.7% 1.5% 5.6% 5.5% 6.1% 3.6% 5.4% 7.9% 
Consumer Staples 4.1% 3.4% 18.0% 0.1% 10.2% 11.1% 1.3% 7.9% 6.1% 4.0% -- 3.6% 8.8% 
Financials 8.5% 4.7% 16.1% 0.1% 8.3% 8.8% 1.0% 6.6% 3.4% 4.8% 2.0% 6.3% 6.9% 
Health Care 4.4% -- 13.0% 0.2% 8.7% 8.9% 1.2% 4.8% 4.4% 0.6% -- 1.8% 9.6% 
Industrials 6.5% 4.2% 10.9% 0.1% 7.8% 9.4% 1.4% 7.4% 7.2% 5.3% -- 4.9% 8.0% 
Oil and Gas 10.7% 11.8% 21.2% 0.2% 8.2% -- 0.1% 7.1% 6.4% 2.1% 4.9% 6.9% 9.8% 
Technologies 2.4% -- 15.6% 0.0% 10.9% 11.2% 3.5% 7.4% 8.2% 3.2% -- 7.0% 8.8% 
Telecommunication 1.4% 6.4% 8.0% 0.1% 4.7% 5.8% 0.1% 4.8% 5.0% 3.3% 1.0% 5.2% 6.0% 
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Table 4: Volatility Spillover Index – Percentage of foreign country’s equity market volatility contributed by the U.S. equity market volatility (contd.) 
Panel C: Financial Crisis 
 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Aggregate 8.4% 9.9% 12.5% 5.1% 7.2% 6.9% 3.7% 6.9% 7.1% 4.7% 4.4% 6.9% 7.3% 
Basic Materials 10.8% 13.0% 14.6% 1.8% 8.2% 8.6% 2.5% 9.1% 7.7% 6.3% 6.6% 6.8% 10.1% 
Consumer Staples 8.6% 5.8% 13.4% 2.2% 11.4% 6.5% 3.8% 6.8% 10.2% 3.9% -- 6.9% 11.4% 
Financials 9.2% 8.3% 14.8% 2.8% 6.6% 7.1% 4.6% 6.4% 7.0% 5.5% 3.4% 6.8% 7.1% 
Health Care 8.0% -- 9.6% 2.3% 11.2% 12.1% 3.4% 6.4% 10.8% 0.7% -- 6.7% 9.8% 
Industrials 9.2% 9.3% 15.8% 1.7% 8.3% 8.9% 2.9% 6.4% 8.0% 4.2% -- 7.0% 7.7% 
Oil and Gas 10.7% 13.2% 17.4% 1.7% 9.6% -- 0.9% 9.8% 9.0% 3.2% 5.6% 6.8% 10.2% 
Technologies 8.8% -- 15.2% 1.5% 10.1% 11.0% 5.1% 6.1% 11.7% 7.3% -- 7.2% 10.3% 
Telecommunication 3.2% 12.8% 6.9% 0.5% 4.9% 5.6% 3.1% 7.3% 8.5% 3.8% 4.0% 7.4% 7.2% 
Utilities 3.8% 12.5% 14.5% 0.3% 6.8% 8.0% 0.3% 6.6% 5.6% 4.4% 4.5% 6.5% 6.9% 
 
Panel D: Post-Financial Crisis 
 
  Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Italy Japan Korea Russia Spain UK 
Aggregate 8.2% 9.8% 12.7% 6.4% 7.2% 7.5% 4.2% 6.3% 7.4% 5.8% 5.8% 6.2% 7.8% 
Basic Materials 9.8% 11.3% 14.0% 2.5% 7.9% 9.3% 4.1% 7.9% 8.1% 7.0% 5.5% 7.4% 9.1% 
Consumer Staples 5.0% 9.0% 12.6% 1.0% 8.3% 9.3% 2.8% 7.6% 8.7% 3.2% -- 6.2% 8.6% 
Financials 8.7% 8.9% 13.9% 1.2% 7.3% 8.8% 3.1% 5.8% 7.6% 7.3% 4.8% 5.5% 8.5% 
Health Care 7.1% -- 10.8% 0.7% 9.5% 10.0% 2.0% 8.3% 9.6% 0.5% -- 8.5% 9.9% 
Industrials 9.5% 9.1% 15.5% 2.0% 8.4% 9.9% 3.4% 7.4% 8.6% 6.2% -- 7.4% 8.6% 
Oil and Gas 10.2% 9.4% 18.0% 3.0% 8.6% -- 2.0% 7.7% 9.2% 6.8% 7.3% 7.2% 9.7% 
Technologies 5.0% -- 10.2% 1.4% 10.7% 11.6% 4.9% 2.6% 10.2% 6.7% -- 6.7% 9.4% 
Telecommunication 3.2% 6.2% 7.4% 0.9% 4.6% 6.3% 0.8% 4.8% 3.7% 1.1% 3.2% 6.0% 7.1% 
Utilities 4.3% 7.4% 11.2% 0.6% 4.9% 5.4% 1.3% 3.6% 1.0% 1.7% 3.0% 4.7% 5.7% 
Volatility spillover Index measures the percentage of a country’s return volatility contributed by the corresponding stock market volatility in the U.S.  The Diebold-Yilmaz (2012) uses the variance 










            
Table 5: Winners and Losers on the basis of vulnerability to the U.S. originated volatility spillover 
 
Equity Sectors   

















Technologies Telecommunication Utilities 
  
 Sample              
Full Sample 
Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada Canada Brazil Canada   
Lowest India China China China Korea China India China China China   
              
Pre-financial 
Crisis 
Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Brazil   
Lowest India China China China China China India China China China   
                
Financial 
Crisis 
Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada Canada Brazil Canada   
Lowest India China China China Korea China India China China China   
             
              
Post-financial 
Crisis 
Highest Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Germany Canada Canada   
Lowest India China China China Korea China India China India China   
Note: In this table, we sort the 13 countries in order of volatility spillover from the U.S. to identify the highest and lowest volatility spillover countries.  Volatility spillover 
is measured using Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) methodology.  Highest represents the country that was most exposed to the volatility spillover while lowest represents the 
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Table 6: Portfolio construction using Spillover Index as a screening tool 
 
Panel A: Aggregate 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 5.51% 7.10% 3.78% 12.44% 14.04% 10.63% -19.17% -19.94% -19.82% 7.33% 10.21% 5.62% 
Annual Std. 13.70% 15.75% 14.50% 9.42% 11.76% 9.55% 22.41% 23.42% 23.55% 11.48% 13.07% 12.38% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.08 0.17 -0.04 0.59 0.59 0.37 -1.72 -1.02 -1.01 0.22 0.58 0.25 
Panel B: All Sectors 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 7.18% 7.97% 6.20% 11.71% 13.89% 11.03% -11.49% -7.98% -16.46% 10.10% 10.24% 7.51% 
Annual Std. 8.38% 9.36% 10.02% 6.05% 6.89% 7.42% 11.40% 13.54% 12.98% 7.07% 8.22% 9.19% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.33 0.38 0.18 0.88 0.98 0.53 -1.89 -0.88 -1.57 0.68 0.93 0.54 
Panel C: Basic Materials 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 6.22% 6.35% 6.29% 22.12% 22.04% 20.27% -15.96% -20.27% -12.32% 3.53% 3.53% 3.53% 
Annual Std. 16.04% 16.53% 19.39% 10.71% 11.36% 13.02% 24.56% 25.19% 30.35% 14.80% 15.46% 17.18% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.12 0.12 0.10 1.11 1.32 1.01 -1.27 -0.96 -0.53 -0.05 0.06 0.06 
Panel D: Consumer Goods 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 10.07% 9.94% 7.26% 15.32% 16.67% 8.66% -15.72% -8.53% -19.44% 12.15% 10.67% 15.36% 
Annual Std. 10.51% 10.81% 13.89% 9.89% 10.56% 12.76% 12.78% 17.46% 13.61% 8.61% 8.78% 11.49% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.54 0.51 0.21 1.04 0.91 0.12 -1.91 -0.71 -1.72 0.74 0.92 1.11 
Panel E: Financials 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 4.88% 6.02% 3.78% 12.64% 19.61% 11.19% -23.18% -23.18% -23.18% 7.95% 9.09% 7.65% 
Annual Std. 14.10% 17.78% 14.93% 8.04% 12.16% 8.33% 24.75% 27.92% 27.15% 11.55% 15.37% 12.28% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.59 1.03 0.49 -1.95 -0.97 -1.00 0.25 0.42 0.41 
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Table 6: Portfolio construction using Spillover Index as a screening tool( contd.) 
 
Panel F: Health Care 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 10.07% 10.30% 7.66% 8.49% 9.97% 4.54% -8.41% -8.29% -15.37% 16.85% 18.93% 13.97% 
Annual Std. 9.94% 10.51% 12.05% 7.45% 7.81% 10.33% 12.89% 14.69% 15.89% 9.22% 9.83% 11.36% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.57 0.56 0.27 0.41 0.37 -0.25 -1.29 -0.83 -1.21 1.26 1.66 1.00 
Panel G: Industrials 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 6.85% 8.67% 3.78% 15.52% 16.58% 7.71% -23.18% -22.23% -23.18% 11.57% 9.36% 11.09% 
Annual Std. 13.14% 14.38% 14.38% 9.42% 9.50% 13.98% 20.04% 20.77% 23.74% 11.19% 13.83% 11.85% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.19 0.30 -0.04 0.85 1.00 0.04 -2.10 -1.26 -1.14 0.55 0.49 0.72 
Panel H: Oil and Gas 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 5.37% 6.31% 3.78% 19.01% 19.38% 15.82% -16.18% -17.61% -2.16% 3.53% 3.53% 3.53% 
Annual Std. 15.77% 16.50% 19.37% 12.12% 13.01% 14.97% 22.49% 22.89% 30.46% 14.76% 14.76% 19.93% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.93 0.94 0.58 -1.30 -0.94 -0.20 -0.05 0.06 0.05 
Panel I: Technology 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 5.03% 5.09% 3.78% 8.20% 8.73% 4.54% -19.58% -23.18% -16.15% 12.84% 13.72% 10.89% 
Annual Std. 15.33% 15.71% 20.22% 14.49% 14.67% 22.66% 19.66% 19.98% 25.92% 12.47% 13.24% 14.69% 
Sharpe Ratio 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.25 0.11 -0.11 -1.56 -1.36 -0.77 0.55 0.84 0.57 
Panel J: Telecommunication 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 3.78% 3.78% 3.80% 4.54% 4.75% 4.54% -10.37% -9.75% -14.28% 6.25% 5.91% 8.09% 
Annual Std. 10.94% 12.67% 14.70% 10.16% 11.80% 13.80% 15.69% 16.02% 20.29% 8.38% 10.02% 10.41% 
Sharpe Ratio -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.20 -0.19 -1.35 -0.85 -0.90 0.17 0.33 0.53 
Panel K: Utilities 
 2002-2015 Pre-financial Crisis Financial Crisis Post Financial Crisis 
  No Screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. No screening Low vol. High vol. 
Annual Return 4.81% 3.78% 5.18% 12.23% 12.56% 11.29% -10.60% -16.43% -10.28% 3.53% 3.53% 3.92% 
Annual Std. 9.64% 11.63% 11.32% 6.33% 8.10% 7.99% 14.95% 17.58% 17.85% 8.71% 10.83% 9.28% 
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